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A Constructive Critique of Mario
Bunge’s Theory of Truth
David Martín Solano1
RESUME — La vérité est le degré d’exactitude d’une représentation de la réalité.
Nous postulons trois étapes cognitives : le psychon, produit par la perception ; le
construit, produit par intellection ; et l’acte de parole, produit par la communica-
tion. La vérité se trouve à la seconde étape ; seuls les construits sont aléthiques.
La vérité est une qualité qui vient en degrés. La certitude est le point d’aboutisse-
ment parfait et inaccessible de cette gradation ; il s’agit donc d’un concept idéal.
Une thèse est réputée vraie si son degré aléthique est acceptablement efficace,
sinon la thèse est considérée comme fausse. En d’autres termes, nous jugeons
vraie toute thèse n’ayant pas assez d’échecs pour qu’elle soit considérée comme
fausse.
ABSTRACT — Truth is the degree of accuracy when representing reality. We postu-
late three cognitive stages: the psychon, produced by perception; the construct,
produced by intellection; and the speech act, produced by communication. Truth
lies in the second; only constructs are alethic. Truth is a quality which takes place
in degrees. Certainty is the unreachable perfect tip of this gradation, so it is an
ideal concept. A thesis is deemed true if its alethic degree is acceptably efficacious,
otherwise the thesis is deemed false. In other words, we deem true any thesis not
having enough fails to deem it false.
1 David Martín was born in Soria (Spain) in 1983. He is a doctor in humanities for the Universidad de La
Rioja (Spain) since October 2019. He has worked in the private education from 2008 to 2015, when he
began his doctoral thesis, and now he works in the secondary education from January 2020 to the present.
In his doctoral thesis he tries to assess Mario Bunge’s work and to place it within the realm of philosophy
and the human intellect. The thesis is entitled: Los límites del conocimiento y el alcance de la racionalidad.
He published a shorter and more manageable version in August 2020, under the title Ciencia y racionali-
dad en la obra de Mario Bunge at Doble J editions.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Those who study knowledge, or who use it to study some theoretical or practical
problem, take as a goal to represent reality in an accurate manner, i.e. to beget
ideas informing the person about how it is the universe surrounding her, for her
to get on successfully in it. A requisite entailed by this aim is to tackle one of the
oldest and more important problems in philosophy: what truth is. All philosoph-
ical currents include this question in their problematics and diverse solutions
struggle for acceptance. We propose a correspondence theory, built upon the
Bungean theory of truth, which we try to complete.
We dismiss hermeneutic theories of truth because the concept they consider,
wrongly referred to as “truth”, is distinct from the one we consider here. They
are valid theories—the ones that turn out to be valid—, but theories about an-
other issue, namely, conviction assessment. We postulate a radical distinction
between, from one side, intendment2 (Erklärung in German), which consists in
the obtainment and organization of notions (as objective as possible) and which
corresponds to honorness 3 , i.e. non-deceitful conveyance of facts and
knowledge, and, from the other side, understanding (Verstehen in German),
which consists in the obtainment and organization of convictions (sensibly sub-
jective) and which corresponds to honesty, i.e. non-deceitful conveyance of feel-
ings or desires or opinions. The former produces a system of ideas representing
reality, whose only validity criterion is its resemblance to this reality. The latter
produces a system of ideas that reorganizes this representation around the sub-
ject whose validity criteria are others, only retaining from the former system the
principle of not transgressing truth.
Another class of alternative theories, reasonable but wrong, are those that
identify truth with its hypernym, the justification of its validity (Sáez Rueda
2 “Intendment” in the sense of “entender” in Spanish. (Ed.)
3 “Honorness” in the sense of “honradez” in Spanish. (Ed.)
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1995, 176). This is the so-called “consensual theory of truth”, proposed by the
current named “critical theory” and which in fact deals with one of the proper-
ties of the theses, namely, that they are acceptable. Once again, these are more
or less correct theories about a distinct issue.
The best Bungean contribution to this question is not, as he said, definitive
(Mario Bunge 2012). He continued investigating the problem because he knew
that he had not found a satisfactory conclusion (Mario Bunge 2014, 149, 215;
Romero 2015). The path starts on a smooth slope “as for the problem of truth as
adequation, […] all realists believe in this ‘theory’ of truth, but no one has been
able to formulate it” (Mario Bunge 2008); “all scientists use tacitly the so-called
theory of correspondence or adequation of things to facts. But nobody has yet
formulated this theory” (Mario Bunge 2009, 125). But it goes rather complex
quite soon. Without his now impossible permission, we propose a plausible way
of solving it.
2 ADEQUATING THE MIND TO THE THINGS
In order to elaborate our proposal, we offer two conjectures of our own: the the-
ory of the three stages and the theory of cognitive maquetting.
Instead of the traditional scheme {fact → construct → speech act}, we propose
three processes producing three cognitive stages: {fact → psychon4 → construct
→ speech act}. The irst process is apprehension and consists of sensing or im-
agining a fact and processing the resulting image by means of a mechanism
called “perception” that adjusts it to the cognitive system, in which it gets inte-
grated. The second process is inference and consists of psychons combining with
each other so they beget new psychons, more complex than them. This process
resembles perception and increase the cognitive stock. Both mediate and imme-
diate cognitive psychons get integrated in the cognitive system. The third pro-
cess is formulation and consists of making a second representation: the con-
structs and its relations with signs that, by means of semiotic mechanisms, form
a message, i.e. a communication act which allows another person to think a con-
struct analogous to the one represented by the person who formulates. Note that
the sender and the receiver may be the same person; in this case, the sender tries
to make him or herself to think again a certain construct.
4 A psychon is a collection of neurons interacting to produce an idea, or an idea’s part, or a collection of
ideas. For this concept, see Bunge, 1983.
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Truth is in the third stage, produced by the second process. Bunge claimed its
distinction from the previous stage: propositions are alethic (i.e. they have the
quality of being either true or false) (Mario Bunge [1996] 1999, 78); in their turn,
it is impossible for concepts to be alethic. And he is also the one who found the
yearned key in a revealing paragraph where he distinguished the idea, which is
the factual mental element, from the proposition, which is its formal counter-
part:
Thoughts are, unlike constructs, cerebral processes. Hence, there cannot
be two thoughts completely identical. Nobody thinks twice in exactly the
same manner the number 5 or the moon, at least we never experience ex-
actly the same states. What we can suppose is that all thought processes
producing the number 5 (or any other construct) use the same neural pat-
terns, that is, they are equivalent in an essential aspect (Mario Bunge 2011,
176)
We add the distinction of the next stage. On the one hand, a proposition’s alethic
properties shall not be confused with its semiotic properties: the ways of formu-
lating it and the ways of interpreting this formulation. On the other hand, they
shall neither be confused with their social properties: their acceptance by the
investigative community or by the society in which this is contained, and its val-
idation as an argument in a debate among members of this community or this
society.
In the second conjecture we tackle the problem of what is the representation
of reality. One of the suggested solutions is Wittgenstein’s (Wittgenstein [1922]
2012) pictorial theory: the mental representation and the represented reality
are isomorphic. We excuse not to expound the vehement refusal it aroused and
its profuse refutations. Nevertheless, we believe that Wittgenstein almost hit the
mark. The mind does not reflect reality like a burnished surface, but it builds an
image from cognitive pieces analogous to real elements5. This mental construc-
tion mimics the structure of a universe’s fragment, and it does it by discarding
some elements and adding others of its own. It is partial maquette, both defec-
tive and exceeding.
5 Tootell et al. (1982, 1998) and Kosslyn (in Gärdenfors 2014) demonstrate that cortical neurons order
themselves in a way that configure the perceived object.
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3 FORMAL CONSISTENCY
All constructs must abide the requisite of formal consistency if they are to pos-
sess the alethic quality, that is, if they are to be either true or false. The so-called
“formal truth” is not an alternative or complementary truth, with its own theory,
nor a component of truth, with its corresponding part in the theory, nor anything
like this. Our conjecture opposes the deflationary theories, led by Tarski, which
conflate the test of epistemic theories, a task for epistemology, with the test of
epistemological theories, also a task for epistemology (Tarski 1944). Put other-
wise, they conflate the analysis of truth with the analysis of the theory of truth.
Bunge seemed to agree: one has to distinguish the alethic status a proposition
has, from whether it is correct or wrong to attribute it to the status (Mario Bunge
[2006] 2007, 354)6. But he swung from distinction—testing formal validity must
precede testing truth or falsity, which is factual by necessity (Mario Bunge 1959,
72)—to indistinction—it is incomplete and thus flawed that a theory does not
satisfy the two classes of truth: formal and factual (Mario Bunge 2014, 203)—,
and this alternation is one of the hurdles that impeded him to bring a solution to
the problem. He even took a stance near to ours (Mario Bunge and Mahner 1997,
129): we need a theory of coherence to tackle “formal truth” and a theory of cor-
respondence to tackle “factual truth”. Had he remarked and maintained the dis-
tinction, he would have made a crucial stride in the matter.
4 TRUTH AS A PRIVATIVE CONCEPT
Abstractions are concepts without real correlate, but useful as epistemic sup-
ports. For the present inquiry we are interested in those based on negation.
Shortage consists of an ens (a being) possessing a quality in less quantity than it
is normal for the entia of its category. Lack consists of an ens not possessing a
quality that the entia of its category used to possess. Defective concepts are those
which consist of a lack such as bald or amputee. Privative concepts are those
which consist of a shortage such as cleanness or security. Ideal concepts are
those which consist of a zero degree of shortage, which ex hypothesi is unattain-
able, such as immaculateness and certainty. Rebic7 concepts are a class of nega-
tive concepts consisting not in the possession of a differential quality but in
6 Besides, truth and knowledge are interdependent. Marquis is wrong when he says that knowledge is
independent of truth since some animals are able to know without needing it. He conflates truth per se
with truth as a subject matter (Marquis 1990).
7 We coin both the concept and the term. The word comes from the mythological character Rebis.
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denying a quality or property. Some rebic concepts are “non-smoker”, because
it cannot be specified what a person has to do to qualify as this, and “atheist”, for
there is no set of beliefs that a person has to profess in order to be this. Rebic
would be the contrary concept for “bald” or a concept opposite to “vegetarian”
and “vegan”. Rebic concepts are “active voice”, “direct problem” and “darkness”.
However, neither “right-handed” nor “heterosexual” are rebic, because, contrary
to the non-smoker”, these persons do perform actions that characterize them as
such.
And, finally, the conjecture. Truth and falsity are two intervals in the same
gradation: the degree of structural correspondence of constructs with the ele-
ments of reality that they represent. The uppermost degree of correspondence
is unreachable, so truth is necessarily partial and meliorable. A proposition may
be more or less truth, or else more or less false. Between truth and falsity there
is a threshold, that is, there are liminal cases amid them in which the distinction
is not clear. Both gnosis (daily knowledge) and episteme (professionalized
knowledge) narrow this threshold. As it can be said of any acceptable proposi-
tion that it has a degree of truth, it can also be said that it has a degree of falsity.
Unacceptable propositions also have a degree of falsity, albeit it uses to be omit-
ted, for the sake of clarity, in which tiny degree they are true.
Bunge argued that, “strictly speaking, no theory can be assigned a truth value,
because this assignation requires to check its infinite formulas” (Mario Bunge
1983, 6:137). We reply that only actual ideas, whatever they are, are that which
is under consideration. Said otherwise, the expressed ideas are propositions
whose veracity is to be evaluated. We also rebut the traditional thesis: “false:
untrue” (Mario Bunge 2003, 105). According to our theory, “true” is defined as
“unfalse enough”.
5 CONCLUSION
This article proposes a readjustment of the investigation of truth. Firstly, taking
it back to its original track: to fit as tightly as possible what one thinks of what
indeed takes place. There are other intellectual activities which thoughts abides
to distinct criteria; these are not truth, which is exclusive to intellectual activities
of knowing. Secondly, restating this centenary approach. Instead of considering
the positive aspect, that inevitably drains from the epistemologist’s hands, its
reverse is what ought to be considered. This is the real alethic substance, the
property possessed by propositions and inquirable in them. The first movement
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follows Bunge’s steps; the second departs subtly from him, perhaps (we hope)
to the crux of the matter.
In order to sustain this eversive thesis we have postulated: (i) a formal thesis
to distinguish factual truth testing from formal consistency testing, the latter a
requisite for truth and not a part of it; (ii) a theory amid ontology and semantics
to explain negative abstractions; and (iii) two theories belonging to applied psy-
chology: on the stages of the formation of knowledge and on the structuration of
knowledge.
We think that our restatement of the classical approach to truth may be pro-
ductive for enhancing theoretical and practical advances in this field and as a
reference to evaluate other theories of truth by comparing their postulates and
conclusions with theirs.
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